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Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) legal order has long been at the forefront of the development of 
social rights as a means of equalising and, in some instances, furthering labour rights.  
+RZHYHUWKH(8¶VXQGHUO\LQJUDWLRQDOHIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIVRFLDOULJKWVKDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\
been one of economic reasoning. At an international level, such rights are articulated as 
fundamental rights in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the European 
Social Charter (ESC) and in Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In 
recenW\HDUVWKH(8¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHDSSURSULDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOERGLHVKDVEHFRPH
increasingly formalised. All EU Member States are members of the ESC1 and the ECHR. 
Both instruments are referred to in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as sources inspiring the social objectives of 
the EU. The relevant ILO Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining 
KDYHEHHQUDWLILHGE\DOORIWKH(8¶VPHPEHUVWDWHVDQGWKXVIRUPSDUWRIWKeir constitutional 
principles. Finally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), which, following its enactment 
E\WKH7UHDW\RI/LVERQIRUPVSDUWRIWKH(8¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDORUGHUHQFRPSDVVHVWKH(&+5
                                                          
1 A number of states have made reservations to articles 5 and 6 of the ESC which protect the right to organise 
and the right to bargain collectively. For a full list see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=163&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1.  
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ESC and ILO principles and so can be seen as a linchpin in the consolidation of the EU and 
international law regimes. At the same time, however, the judicial interpretation given to 
social rights, particularly collective rights, in the EU and international legal orders is 
diverging. This gives rise to an interesting conundrum for EU Member States: how should 
they reconcile their conflicting obligations under the ECHR, ESC and ILO Conventions with 
those under the EU Treaties?   
 
This chapter begins by considering the relationship between the Member States, the EU and 
the relevant instruments of international law.  The disparate systems under which labour 
standards have developed impose conflicting obligations on EU Member States in certain 
respects.  The varying interpretations given to the rights to freedom of association and 
collective action within the EU and international legal orders are used to illustrate such 
conflict. The chapter assesses the impact that an increasingly formal relationship between EU 
DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVOLNHO\WRKDYHRQ(8ODZ¶VVXpremacy. In conclusion, the authors 
question whether the CFR, which consolidates the EU and international law regimes, also has 
the capacity to reconcile the differing labour standards that have evolved. 
 
 
Relationships of International Law 
 
The Member States of the European Union are signatories to the ECHR, the ESC and relevant 
ILO Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 [here] 
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Adopting Body European Union Council of Europe International 
Labour 
Organisation 
Relevant Text Community Social 
Charter (CSC) 
(1989) 
Articles 11-13 
guarantee the right 
to freedom of 
association, 
collective 
bargaining, and the 
right to strike. 
European 
Convention 
on Human 
Rights 
(ECHR) 
(1953) 
Article 11 
protects the 
right to 
freedom of 
association 
European 
Social 
Charter 
(ESC) 
(1965; 
revised 
1996) 
Article 5 
guarantees 
a right to 
organise.  
Article 6 
protects the 
right to 
bargain 
collectively 
Convention 
concerning 
Freedom of 
Association and 
Protection of the 
Right to Organise  
(1950) 
Convention 
concerning the 
Application of the 
Principles of the 
Right to Organise 
and to Bargain 
Collectively 
(1951) 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights (CFR) 
(2009) 
Article 12 
guarantees freedom 
of association. 
Article 28 provides 
a right of collective 
bargaining and 
action 
Monitoring Organ Court of Justice of 
the European 
Union (CJEU) 
European 
Court of 
Human 
Rights 
(ECtHR) 
European 
Committee 
on Social 
Rights 
(ECSR) 
Committee of 
Experts 
Member States Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Republic of 
Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the 
UK. 
All EU 
Member 
States 
All EU 
Member 
States apart 
from 
Greece 
have 
ratified 
articles 5 
and 6. 
Austria 
considers 
itself 
bound by 
article 5 
but not 
article 6.  
All EU Member 
States 
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Member States have thus committed to respect the obligations laid down within these texts. 
At the same time, EU Member States are bound by EU law including by decisions of the 
CJEU under the well-known doctrine of supremacy.2 Article 351 TFEU provides that rights 
and obligations that existed between Member States or between a Member State and a third 
FRXQWU\SULRUWRWKH6WDWH¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSµVKDOOQRWEHDIIHFWHGE\WKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKH
7UHDWLHV¶:KHUHVXFKDJUHHPHQWVDUHQRWFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKH7UHDWLHVWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV
FRQFHUQHGµ«VKDOOWDNHDOODSSURSULDWHVWHSVWRHOLPLQDWHWKHLQFRPSDWLEilities established.3 
+RZHYHUEHFDXVHDQXPEHURI0HPEHU6WDWHV¶UDWLILFDWLRQRIWKH(&+5WKH(6&RUWKH,/2
Conventions pre-dates their EU membership,4 it is unclear whether Member States should 
give precedence to EU law in cases where this conflicts with their international obligations.5 
$IXUWKHUFRPSOLFDWLQJIDFWRULVWKH(8¶VLPSHQGLQJDFFHVVLRQWRWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSHDQG
the ECHR which became an obligation under the Lisbon Treaty6 but which does not include 
WKH(6&$WWKHWLPHRIZULWLQJWKHGUDIW$JUHHPHQWRQWKH(8¶V$FFHVVLRQWRWKH(&+5LV
the subject of some uncertainty having been ruled incompatible with EU law by the CJEU.7 
This development and its likely impact on the furtherance of labour rights will be considered 
at the end of this chapter.    
 
 
Collective Labour Rights within the EU and International Legal Orders 
 
                                                          
2 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] CMLR 105 and Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
3 Cases C-364-365/95 T. Port GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (1998) ECR I-1023. 
4 For an overview of the dates of ratification for the ECHR see: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTableauCourt.asp?MA=3&CM=16&CL=ENG; for the ESC see: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp; for Convention 87 see: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312232; and, for 
Convention 98 see: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312243.   
5 See further M Rocca, µ$FODVKRINLQJV 7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLWWHHRI6RFLDO5LJKWVRQWKHµ/H[/DYDO¶«DQG
RQWKH(8IUDPHZRUNIRUWKHSRVWLQJRIZRUNHUV¶(XURSHDQ-RXUQDORI6RFLDO/DZ-232. 
6 See Article 6(2) TEU, and Protocol 8. 
7 Opinion 2/13 of the Court, 18 December 2014. 
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The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The ECtHR has considered collective labour rights on a number of occasions in cases brought 
under Article 11 ECHR which guarantees the right to freedom of association.8 It has 
FRQVLVWHQWO\KHOGWKDWµthe right to bargain collectively and to enter into collective agreements 
does not constitute an LQKHUHQWHOHPHQWRI$UWLFOH¶9. Similarly, it has always found 
restrictions on the right to collective actLRQWREHMXVWLILDEOHDVEHLQJµnecessary in a 
democratic society¶10 thereby giving states a wide margin of appreciation.  On a number of 
occasions,11 although it did accept the importance of collective action for trade unions, the 
Court stopped short of explicitly recognising a right to strike. However, in Demir and 
Baykara WKH&RXUWKHOGWKDWµWKHULJKWWREDUJDLQFROOHFWLYHO\>«@KDVLQSULQFLSOHbecome 
RQHRIWKHHVVHQWLDOHOHPHQWVRI>«@$UWLFOHRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶12, thus enshrining a 
fundamental right to collective bargaining in the ECHR. The Court justified its change of 
approach on the basis that it shRXOGµtake account of the perceptible evolution in such matters, 
in both international law and domestic legal systems.¶13  
 
In Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen the ECtHR went evHQIXUWKHUE\UHFRJQLVLQJWKDWµstrike action, which 
enables a trade union to make its voice heard, constitutes an important aspect in the protection 
RIWUDGHXQLRQPHPEHUV¶LQWHUHVWV¶14   Ewing and Hendy argue that not only does this decision 
µstrongly suggest that the court was accepting that the right to strike, insofar as it is exercised 
in furtherance of collective bargaining, is HTXDOO\³HVVHQWLDO´¶EXWDOVRWKDWµbreach of the right 
                                                          
8 )RUDGHWDLOHGRYHUYLHZRIWKH(&W+5¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHVHH)'RUVVHPRQW./|UFKHUDQG,6FK|PDQQHGV
The European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation (Hart, 2013). 
9 See National Union of Belgian Police (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 578; Swedish Engine Drivers' Union (1979-80) 1 
E.H.R.R. 617; and Schmidt and Dahlström v Sweden (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 632. 
10 Supra n. 9. See also Schettini v Italy, Application no. 29529/95, judgment of 9 November 2000. 
11 Wilson v UK [2002] ECHR 552; ASLEF v UK (2007) 45 EHRR 34; UNISON v UK, judgment of 10 January 
2002.  
12 Para. 154. 
13 Para. 153. 
14 Para. 24. 
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to strike alone [in this case] was a breach of Article 11.¶15  Unlike in previous cases, the Court 
did not accept the justification put forward by the Turkish government finding the restriction 
to be unnecessary in a democratic society. Although, in the subsequent case of RMT v United 
Kingdom,16 the ECtHR has been accused of backtracking by finding a complete ban on 
secondary strike action to be justified under Article 11(2) ECHR, 17 it has nevertheless 
confirmHGWKDWWKHULJKWWRVWULNHLVµclearly protected¶18 by Article 11(1) ECHR thereby firmly 
entrenching a right to strike within the Convention. 
 
The European Social Charter 
 
The ESC has the same status as the ECHR and acts as its counterpart in the context of 
economic and social rights by providing a range of minimum labour standards.19 It is cited in 
WKHSUHDPEOHVRIERWKWKH7)(8DQG7(8DVDVRXUFHRILQVSLUDWLRQIRUWKH(8¶VVRFLDO
objectives and is referenced in Article 151 TFE87KH(6&¶VPRQLWRULQJV\VWHPZKLFK
requires member states to submit annual reports to the European Committee of Social Rights 
(ECSR)20 has resulted in a number of decisions on Article 521 ZKLFKJXDUDQWHHVWKHµULJKWWR
RUJDQLVH¶DQG$UWLFOHZKLFKFRQWDLQs the right to collective bargaining (Article 6(2)) and the 
right to strike (Article 6(4)). Article 5 has been interpreted broadly by the ECSR as including 
rights to join/not to join a trade union and the prohibition of discrimination of trade union 
members. Moreover, trade union independence must be assured and excessive state 
                                                          
15 .'(ZLQJDQG-+HQG\µ7KH'UDPDWLF,PSOLFDWLRQVRIDemir and Baykara¶,QGXVWULDO/DZ-Rurnal 2, 
14. 
16 (2009) 48 EHRR 54. 
17 $%RJJDQG.'(ZLQJµ7KH,PSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHRMT FDVH¶,QGXVWULDO/DZ-RXUQDO 
18 Para 83. 
19 6HH6(YMXµ7KH(XURSHDQVRFLDO&KDUWHU¶LQ5%ODQSDLQHGThe Council of Europe and the Social 
Challenges of the XXI Century (Kluwer Law, 2001), 19. 
20 The conclusions of the Committee are published every year and posted on the website of the Council of 
Europe (http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/ConclusionsIndex_en.asp). 
21 On Article 5 see NA Casey, The Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively: Protection within the European 
Social Charter (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1996), 11-45. 
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interference is prohibited. 22 The ECSR has interpreted Article 6(2) to mean that employers 
DQGZRUNHUVPXVWµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKOHJLVODWLRQRILQGXVWULDOSUDFWLFH>«@>EH@DWOLEHUW\ to 
conclude collective agreements.¶23 Under Article 6(4), the ECSR has criticised states for 
restricting the bases for a right to strike, limiting the beneficiaries of the right and for 
imposing restrictive procedural requirements on the right itself.  However the case law of the 
ECSR has generally adopted a broad and consistent interpretation of Article 6, defining 
FROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDVµ$Q\EDUJDLQLQJEHWZHHQRQHRUPRUHHPSOR\HUVDQGDERG\RI
employees aimed at solving a problem of common interest, wKDWHYHULWVQDWXUHPD\EH¶24 
Conflicts of interest are also referred to in case law on Article 6(4). In its first Conclusions, 
the Committee recognised:  
[T]he right to collective action only in cases of conflicts of interests. It follows that it 
cannot be invoked in cases of conflicts of right.25 
 
Divergences in national laws on the right to strike have prevented the ECSR from developing 
a normative interpretation of the concept of collective action and a definitive analytical 
framework in respect of Article 6(4).26 Thus, although there exists a comprehensive body of 
case law focusing on the right to strike  dating back to the its first Conclusions in 1969, the 
(&65KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVDµUHODWLYHO\LQHIIHFWLYHV\VWHPRIFRQWURO¶27 
 
The International Labour Organisation 
 
                                                          
22 )RUDQRYHUYLHZRIWKHGHFLVLRQVVHHWKH(&65¶V&DVHODZGLJHVWDYDLODEOHDW
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Digest/DigestSept2008_en.pdf.  
23 See D Harris, The European Social Charter, (2nd edn, Transnational Publishers, 2001), 101. 
24 Conclusions IV (1975) 50. 
25 Conclusions I (1969-1970) 38. 
26 Evju supra n. 20, 203 and 200.  
27 6&RSSRODµ6RFLDO5LJKWVLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7KH3RVVLEOH$GGHG9DOXHRID%LQGLQJ&KDUWHURI
)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWV¶LQ*GL)HGHULFRHGThe EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to 
Binding Instrument (Springer, 2011), 203. 
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Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are enshrined in ILO Convention 
no. 87, 1948 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, and 
Convention no. 98, 1949 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, both of which 
have been ratified by all Member States of the EU.28  The voluntary negotiation of collective 
agreements, which is protected under Article 4, ConvHQWLRQLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHµa 
fundamental aspect of the principles of freedom of association¶29. The Convention principles 
also form part of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work which 
obliges all members of the ILO, regardless of ratification of the relevant Conventions, to 
respect, promote and realise, in good faith, the principles contained in the Declaration. The 
adoption of the 1998 ILO Declaration can be interpreted as evidence of a trend towards 
greater protection of collective bargaining in international labour law.30 Although the 
Conventions IDOOVKRUWRIH[SOLFLWUHFRJQLWLRQRIDULJKWWRFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQWKH,/2¶V
Committee of Experts has recognised  such action as an intrinsic corollary of the freedom of 
association contained in Convention no. 87 since the late 1950s31 DQGWKH,/2¶V)UHHGRm of 
Association Committee considers collective action  to be a fundamental right32  DQGµone of 
the essential means through which workers and their organisations may promote and defend 
                                                          
28 These are the main relevant texts. Other ILO conventions and recommendations refer to the respective rights. 
See A Odero and H. Guido, ILO Law on Freedom of Association: Standards and Procedures, (ILO, 1995). On 
&RQYHQWLRQ1RVHH/6ZHSVWRQµ+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZDQG)UHHGRPRI$VVRFLDWLRQ'HYHORSPHQWWKURXJK
,/26XSHUYLVLRQ¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DERXU5HYLHZ 
29 Committee on Freedom of Association Digest of Decisions 1996, para 844. 
30 30DFNOHPµ7KH5LJKWWR%DUJDLQ&ROOHFWLYHO\LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ:RUNHUV¶5LJKW+XPDQ5LJKW
,QWHUQDWLRQDO5LJKW"¶LQ3$OVWRQHGLabour Rights as Human Rights (OUP, 2005), 68. For a critique of the 
ambiguous and broad naWXUHRIWKH'HFODUDWLRQVHH*0XQGODNµ7KH7UDQVIRUPDWLYH:HDNQHVVRI&RUH/DERXU
5LJKWVLQ&KDQJLQJ:HOIDUH5HJLPHV¶LQ(%HQHYLVWLDQG*1ROWHHGVThe Welfare State, Globalization and 
International Law 6SULQJHUDQG.5LWWLFKµ&RUH/DERU5LJKts and Labor Market Flexibility: Two Paths 
(QWZLQHG"¶LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XUHDXRIWKH3HUPDQHQW&RXUWRI$UELWUDWLRQHGVLabor Law Beyond Borders: 
ADR and the Internationalization of Labor Dispute Settlement (Wolters Kluwer, 2003). 
31 ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (International Labour Office, Geneva, International 
Labour Conference, 81st session, 1994). See T Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to 
Strike (OUP, 2003), 192-6. 
32 ILO, Freedom of Association, Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of 
the Governing body of the ILO (4th edn, International labour office, Geneva, 1996), 101, no 473. See also A 
-DFREVµ7KH/DZRI6WULNHVDQG/RFNRXWV¶LQ5 Blanpain and C Engels (eds), Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations in Market Economies (Kluwer, 1998). 
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their HFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOLQWHUHVWV¶33 It is unclear whether, through such development, the 
ILO Committee can be characterised as follower or leader in its relationship with the ESC.34  
 
The European Union 
 
7KH(8¶VFRPSHWHQFHLQWKHVSKHUHRIFROOHFWLYHULJKWVSDUWLFXODUO\IUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ
collective bargaining and collective action35, is limited and any protection takes place largely 
through their status as fundamental rights. Prior to the introduction of the CFR, the EU 
recognised these rights in Articles 11 and 12 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers (Community Social Charter - CSC),  alongside Article 13,  on the 
right to strike.36 7KH&6&¶VSURYLVLRQVDUHDUJXDEO\PRUHLQGLYLGXDOLVWWKDQWKHLU(6&RU
ECHR counterparts. Thus, Article 11(1) precludes the establishment of trade union 
monopolies37 whereas Article 11(2) contains both a positive and a negative right to join a 
trade union. In contrast, the text of the ESC and the ECHR omit the latter although it has been 
LQFOXGHGWKURXJKWKH(&65¶VDQG(&W+5¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH7KH&6&¶VXVHIXOQHVs is however 
limited as it merely represents a commitment by Member States to work towards a common 
set of social policy and labour law objectives38 so that the protection it offers is weak.  The 
accompanying Action Programme placed responsibility for the protection and implementation 
RIULJKWVRQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVµin accordance with their national traditions and policies.¶39 
Nonetheless, the preamble to the Treaty on European UniRQFRQILUPVWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
                                                          
33 ILO, supra n. 33, para 475. 
34 Novitz, supra n. 32, 196-7. 
35 Article 153 TFEU expressly excludes EU competence in respect of the right to freedom of association and the 
right to strike. This does not prevent the Union from using alternative legal bases to propose measures on, for 
example, the exercise of the right to strike. See the failed Monti II proposal COM(2012) 130 proposed under 
article 352 TFEU. For an overview of the proposal see Freedland and Prassl, EU Law in the Member States: 
Viking, Laval and Beyond (Hart, forthcoming). 
36 This is subject to obligations arising under national law and is therefore not an absolute right. 
37 See Young, James and Webster v UK , Eur. Ct. H. R., Series B, No. 39. 
38 7KLVZDVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHFDVHEHWZHHQDQGZKHQWKH8.¶VRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH&KDUWHUSUHYHQWHGLW
from being integrated into the EC Treaty.  
39 COM (89) 568 final. 
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µattachment to fundamental social rights as defined in the 1989 Community Charter¶, and 
Article 151 TFEU makes reference to the CSC. As such, the CSC can be used by the CJEU as 
an interpretative guide in its judgments dealing with social and labour rights.40 The CSC has 
also been used by the ECtHR in its case law on the right to freedom of association.41 
 
Protection of the rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining and collective action 
is now guaranteed by Articles 12 and 28 CFR.  Although the wording of both Articles 
specifies that their aim is to provide workers with clearly defined rights,42 their effectiveness 
DVLQGLYLGXDOO\HQIRUFHDEOHULJKWVZLOOGHSHQGRQWKH&-(8¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ+LVWRULFDOO\WKH
Court has adopted a positive approach in recognising the existence of collective labour rights 
by deriving their protection from the general principles of EU law. Thus, freedom of 
association was recognised by the CJEU as early as 1974 in Kortner.43  Moreover, the Court 
found a right to collective action to be an integral part of the right to freedom of association in 
the same case and confirmed the fundamental nature of these two rights in Maurissen.44 
However, as both cases dealt with conflicts between EU institutions and their staff, this 
jurisprudence is limited so that although the Court recognised the inviolability of the rights  in 
LWVMXGJPHQWVLWGLGQRWHVWDEOLVKWKHPDVGHVHUYLQJVSHFLILFSURWHFWLRQZLWKLQWKH(8¶VOHJDO
order. This was made explicit in later cases such as Werhof where the CJEU recognised 
freedom of asVRFLDWLRQDVµRQHRIWKHIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVZKLFK>«@DUHSURWHFWHGLQWKH
                                                          
40 See, for example, the Viking and Laval cases where inter alia the Charter was used to justify the existence of a 
fundamental right to strike. 
41 See Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark, judgment of 11 January 2006, applications nos. 52562/99 and 
52620/99. 
42 Supra n. 42, 228-9. 
43 Case 175/73 Union Syndicale, Massa and Kortner v Commission [1974] ECR at para 14. See also Case 18/74 
Syndicat general du personnel v Commission [1974] ECR 933. The Court transferred the recognition of the right 
to freedom of association to non-labour situations in subsequent cases. See Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-
2925.  
44 Joined Cases C-193/87 and C-194/87 Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors 
[1990] ECR I-95 at para 21. 
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[Union] legal order¶45 so it is likely that legislatiYHLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHULJKWµ«FRXOGEH
successfully challenged¶.46  
 
The limited protection of the right to freedom of association afforded by the Court prior to the 
entry into force of the CFR did not automatically imply a right to collective bargaining. 
Indeed, the Advocate General in Albany47 expressly denied the existence of such a right under 
EU law. Following the entry into fRUFHRIWKH&)5DQGLQOLJKWRIWKH(&W+5¶VUHFHQWFDVH
law (discussed above), the CJEU seems to have revised its view, concluding in Commission v 
Germany48 inter alia on the basis of Article 28 CFR that the right to collective bargaining 
should be considered a fundamental right although its exercise can be restricted not only by 
reference to national law but also in accordance with EU law.49  In Commission v Germany, 
this meant that the fundamental right had to be balanced against the right to freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services. The Court has taken a similar approach to 
the fundamental right to take collective action. Whereas the Advocate General in Albany50 
reFRJQLVHGVXFKDULJKWDVEHLQJµprotected by Community law¶ LQVRIDUDVµit is indispensable 
for the enjoyment of freedom of association¶51, the CJEU did not recognise the right to strike 
as a general principle of EU law until 2007 in the controversial Viking and Laval cases.52 As 
                                                          
45 Case C-499/04 Werhof [2006] ECR I-2397 at para 33. 
46 C Barnard, EU Employment Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012), 705. 
47 Case C-67/96 [1999] ECR I-DWSDUDµ,WFDQQRWEHVDLGWKDWWKHUHLVVXIILFLHQWFRQYHUgence of 
national legal orders and international legal instruments on the recognition of a specific fundamental right to 
EDUJDLQFROOHFWLYHO\¶ 
48 Case C-271/08 [2010] ECR I-)RUDQDQDO\VLVVHH36\USLVµ5HFRQFLOLQJ(FRQRPLF)UHHGRPVDQG6RFLDO
Rights ± The Potential of Commission v Germany (Case C--XGJPHQWRI-XO\¶,QGXVWULDO
/DZ-RXUQDO&%DUQDUGDQG6'HDNLQµ(XURSHDQ/DERXU/DZDIWHULaval¶LQ0$0RUHDXHGBefore and 
After the Crisis (Elgar, 2011). 
49 Para 43. 
50 See para 139 where he makes reference to Kortner. 
51 Para 159. 
52 C-438/05 7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDQVSRUW:RUNHUV¶)HGHUDWLRQDQG7KH)LQQLVK6HDPHQ¶V8QLRQY9LNLQJ/LQH
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti ECR [2007] I-10779; C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767.  See, M Rönnmar (ed), EU Industrial Relations vs National Industrial 
Relations. Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Kluwer, 2008); R Blanpain and AM Swiatkowski 
(eds), The Laval and Viking Cases: Freedom of Services and Establishment v Industrial Conflict in the European 
Economic Area and Russia .OXZHU5=DKQµ7KH9LNLQJDQG/DYDO&DVHVLQWKH&RQWH[WRI(XURSHDn 
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with the right to collective bargaining, based on Article 28 CFR, this must be exercised in 
accordance with EU law and national law and practices.53 In addition, in Viking and Laval the 
Court introduced a proportionality test which must be satisfied if the exercise of the right to 
strike is to be lawful under EU law. By such means the CJEU has effectively 
µdisembowelled¶54 the right55 RIDQ\HIIHFWDW(8OHYHO7KHGLVFRYHU\WKURXJKWKH&RXUW¶V
judgments in Viking and LavalWKDWWKH&)5¶VSURYLVLRQVdo give rise to specific social rights, 
which are nevertheless subordinated to their economic counterparts, is unsurprising given the 
&KDUWHU¶VFDUHIXOdrafting (see below).56  +RZHYHU$UWLFOH&)5¶VH[SOLFLWDUWLFXODWLRQRI
ZRUNHUV¶µHQWLWOHPHQW¶WRWDNHVWULNHDFWLRQPLJKW\HWSURYLGHDPHFKDQLVPE\ZKLFKWKH(8¶V
acquis can be extended providing the possibility of a self-standing right. This possibility is 
explored further below.     
 
 
Interpreting Social Rights 
 
,QUHFHQW\HDUVFRQYHUJHQFHLQWKHVWDQGDUGVSURYLGHGE\WKH,/2¶V&RQYHQWLRQVWKH(6&DQG
the ECHR has occurred, particularly with regard to the right to collective action. For example, 
WKH(6&¶VSURYLVLRQVODUJHO\PRGHOOHGRQWKHHTXLYDOHQW,/2SURYLVLons, have been 
interpreted in broadly similar terms. Moreover, the scope of the ECHR has been progressively 
widened to include, within the ambit of Article 11, a right to collective action alongside that 
to collective bargaining. However, it would be wrong to conclude that this fledgling trend has 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(QODUJHPHQW¶:HE-&/,1%XVE\DQG5=DKQµ(XURSHDQ/DERXU/DZLQ&ULVLV7KH'HPLVHRI6RFLDO
5LJKWV"¶Contemporary Issues in Law 173; and, articles by A Dashwood, T Novitz, M Rönmar, S Deakin 
and S Sciarra, in C Barnard (ed), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (Hart, 2007-2008). 
53 $UWLFOH&)5H[SOLFLWO\UHVWULFWVZRUNHUV¶HQWLWOHPHQWµLQFDVHVRIFRQIOLFWVRILQWHUHVWWRWDNHFROOHFWLYH
DFWLRQWRGHIHQGWKHLULQWHUHVWVLQFOXGLQJVWULNHDFWLRQ¶E\VWDWLQJWKDWVXFKHQWLWOHPent must accord with EU law. 
54 Ewing and Hendy, supra n. 15, 8, footnote 22. 
55 The CJEU in Viking (at para 44), referring to Article 28 CFR, held that the right to take collective action 
FRQVWLWXWHGµDIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWZKLFKIRUPVDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRI&RPPXQLW\ODZ¶ 
56 3KLO6\USLVDQG7RQLD1RYLW]µ(FRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOULJKWVLQFRQIOLFW3ROLWLFDODQGMXGLFLDODSSURDFKHVWRWKHLU
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ¶>@(/5 
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been the cause of any substantive improvement in the provision of labour rights beyond the 
merely aspirational as, even when combLQHGWKHUHOHYDQWLQVWUXPHQWVµtend to be long on 
promise and short on delivery.¶57 This is not to diminish the potential of such rights to 
µmitigate some of the adverse distributional consequences of globalization¶ as µ[t]heir 
QRUPDWLYHVLJQLILFDQFHWUDQVFHQGVWKHIDFWWKDWWKH\DUHZRUNHUV¶ULJKWVRUKXPDQULJKWVDQG
extends to the justice of the international legal order itself.¶58 (On this point, see Belle-
Antoine in this volume). At the EU level, the trend towards enhanced protection of labour 
ULJKWVLVHYLGHQWLQWKHRU\EXWQRWLQSUDFWLFH$OWKRXJKWKH&-(8¶VFDVHODZKDVSURJUHVVLYHly 
led to an acceptance of collective rights as general priQFLSOHVEROVWHUHGE\WKH&)5¶V
µgenerous provision¶59 for such rights, recent rulings by the Court fall far short of bestowing 
such rights with protected justiciable status. This is evident in the CRXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH
fundamental right to strike in Viking and Laval which has become a source of tension between 
the EU, the ECHR, the ESC and the ILO. For EU Member States, this clash raises a dilemma 
over conflicting obligations owed at the EU and international levels.  
 
 
Conflicts between EU and International Law 
 
(8¶VODZ¶VLQFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWKWKH(&+5LVHQFDSVXODWHGE\WKHUXOLQJVRIWKH&-(8DQGWKH
ECtHR in Viking60, Laval61, Demir and Baykara62, and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen63 which arguably 
place the courts at opposite ends of a spectrum. By invoking, inter alia, WKH(&65¶VFDVHODZ
                                                          
57 30DFNOHPµ7KH5LJKWWR%DUJDLQ&ROOHFWLYHO\LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ:RUNHUV¶5LJKW+XPDQ5LJKW
,QWHUQDWLRQDO5LJKW"¶LQ3$OVWRQHGLabour Rights as Human Rights (OUP, 2005), 82. 
58  Macklem, supra n. 58.  
59 6HH%5\DQµ7KH&KDUWHUDQG&ROOHFWLYH/DERXU/DZ¶LQ7+HUYH\DQG-.HQQHUHGVEconomic and Social 
Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A legal perspective (Hart, 2003), 67-90. 
60 Case C-438/05 [2007] ECR I-10779. 
61 C-341/05 [2007] ECR I-11767. 
62 [2009] 48 E.H.R.R. 54 
63 (2009, unreported). 
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WKH(&W+5¶VVWURQJVXSSRUWIRUWKHULJKWVWRFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDQGFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQPDNH
it difficult to see how it can be reconciled with tKH&-(8¶VZHDNHQLQJRIWKHOHYHORI
SURWHFWLRQDIIRUGHGWRVXFKULJKWVLQDQ(8FRQWH[W+RZHYHUWKH(8¶VLPSHQGLQJDFFHVVLRQ
to the Council of Europe and the need for legal certainty make reconciliation unavoidable.64 
7KH(&W+5¶VUHFHQWGHFLVLRQLQRMT v United Kingdom65 can be considered either as a move 
towards the middle-ground in this respect or a further widening of the chasm that is opening 
up between the two Courts. In RMT, the ECtHR was asked to consider whether secondary 
action ± which was explicitly rejected as a right deserving protection by the CJEU in Viking ± 
comes within the scope of Article 11(1) ECHR. Invoking a range of international 
instruments66 WKH(&W+5H[SDQGHG$UWLFOH¶VVFRSHE\UHFRJQLVLQJVHFRQGDU\DFWLRQDV
part of trade union freedom,  on the basis that: 
 
The Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted in harmony 
ZLWK«DQ\UHOHYDQWUXOHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDSSOLFDEOHLQUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH
parties, and in particular the rules concerning the international protection of human 
rights.67 
 
It thus seems clear that, rather than confining itself to an industrial relations conception of the 
ULJKWWRVWULNHWKH(&W+5LVLQVWHDGIROORZLQJWKH,/2¶VH[DPSOHE\HPEUDFLQJDKXPDQ
rights conception of collective labour rights.68 7KH(&W+5¶VMXGJPHQWQHYHUWKHOHVVJUDQWHG
WKH8.DZLGHPDUJLQRIDSSUHFLDWLRQE\ILQGLQJWKHVWDWH¶VRXWULJKWSURKLELWLRQRIVHFRQGDU\
                                                          
64 See N Busby and R Zahn, 'The EU and the ECHR: Collective and Non-discrimination Labour Rights at a 
Crossroad?' [2014] 30 IJCLLIR 2, 153.   
65 $SSOLFDWLRQQRMXGJPHQWRI$SULO6HH.,VWUHILµ507Y7KH8.([SDQGLQJ$UWLFOH
of the (&+57KURXJK6\VWHPLF,QWHJUDWLRQ¶(-,/7DON0D\DYDLODEOHDWhttp://www.ejiltalk.org/r-m-
t-v-the-uk-expanding-article-11-of-the-echr-through-systemic-integration/> accessed 8 June 2015; A Bogg and 
.'(ZLQJµ7KH,PSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH507&DVH¶Industrial Law Journal 221;  John Hendy QC and 
0LFKDHO)RUG4&µ507Y8QLWHG.LQJGRP6\PSDWK\6WULNHVDQGWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶
(OxHRH Blog, 10 April 2014) available at <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=5214> accessed 8 June 2015. 
66 Specifically Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ILO Convention No. 87 and the ESC. 
67 Para 76. 
68 Ewing and Hendy, supra n. 15, 14-16. 
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strike action to be legitimate and justified, provoking the suggestion that µthe judgment 
represents nRWKLQJVKRUWRIDQDSSHDVHPHQWE\WKH(&W+5RIWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VWKUHDWVWR
withdraw from the European Convention.¶69  Although the ECtHR stopped short of granting 
trade unions greater rights than those recognised by the CJEU, the judgment in RMT does 
little to reconcile the differing attitudes of the two legal systems regarding the recognition of 
collective labour rights. 
 
(8ODZ¶VLQFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWKWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH¶VVWDQFHRQODERXUULJKWVLVQRWFRQILQHG
to the ECHR but is also evident in its rHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(6&)ROORZLQJWKH&-(8¶V
judgment in Laval, two Swedish trade union confederations ± LO and TCO ± submitted a 
complaint to the ECSR.70 In its decision of 20 November 2013 which has been described as µa 
direct challenge to the authority of the Court of Justice¶,71 the ECSR unanimously declared 
the complaint admissible and found that the Swedish legislative amendments resulting from 
Laval (Lex Laval) violated the rights to collective bargaining and collective action in Article 6 
ESC. With UHJDUGWRWKH&-(8¶VMXGJPHQWWKH(&65HPSKDVLVHGWKDWWKH(8¶VIUHH
movement provisions,   
«FDQQRWEHWUHDWHGIURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIWKHV\VWHPRIYDOXHVSULQFLSOHVDQG
fundamental rights embodied in the Charter, as having a greater a priori value than 
core labour rights, including the right to make use of collective action to demand 
further and better protection of the economic and social rights and interests of 
workers.72  
 
                                                          
69 John Hendy QC and Michael Ford QC, supra n. 66. 6HHDOVR1%UDW]Dµ/LYLQJ,QVWUXPHQWRU'HDG/HWWHU± the 
)XWXUHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQULJKWV¶(+5/5 
70 See Complaint No. 85/2012 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Employees (TCO) v Sweden, 12 July 2012. 
71 &%DUQDUGµ0RUH3RVWLQJ¶Industrial Law Journal 194, 207. 
72 ECSR, Decision on Admissibility and the Merits Complaint No. 85/2012 Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
(LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v Sweden, 3 July 2013 at para 122. 
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The ECSR concluded that,  
[N]either the current status of social rights in the EU legal order nor the substance of 
EU legislation and the process by which it is generated would justify a general 
presumption of conformity of legal acts and rules of the EU with the ESC.73  
 
'HVSLWHWKLVGHYHORSPHQWWKH&-(8¶VGHFLVLRQLQCommission v Germany seems to confirm 
that it is set on a course of balancing collective labour rights with economic freedoms. As 
such, it is difficult to envisage how the conflict between the ECSR and the CJEU can be 
resolved.  According to Barnard,   
The EC65¶VSRVLWLRQVHHPVWRIRUHFORVHDQ\SRVVLELOLW\RIDGLDORJXHLWLVDRQH-way 
megaphone communication. Here Realpolitik must step in. If the EU does not respond 
to the ECSR, the ECSR has few tools at its disposal to force the [CJEU] into 
compliance.74 
 
The clash between the ILO and the EU has become obvious in the wake of a joint complaint 
regarding the Laval judgment, similar to that to the ECSR, submitted by LO and TCO to the 
,/2¶V&RPPLWWHHRI([SHUWV&($&5LQ75 Once again, the basis of the complaint was 
WKH6ZHGLVKOHJLVODWLYHFKDQJHVUHVXOWLQJIURPWKH&-(8¶VMXGJPHQWZKLFKWKHDFFRUGLQJWR
WKHWUDGHXQLRQVYLRODWHGWKH,/2¶VFRQYHQWLRQVRQIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQDQGFROOHFWLYH
EDUJDLQLQJLQFOXGLQJWKHULJKWWRVWULNHDQG6ZHGHQ¶VUDWLILFDWLon of them. Furthermore, the 
MXGJPHQWLQWHUIHUHGZLWKWKHXQLRQV¶ 
                                                          
73 Para 74. 
74 Barnard, supra n. 72, 210. 
75 &RPPHQWVE\/2DQG7&2WRWKH,/2¶V&RPPLWWHHRI([SHUWV&($&5RQ6ZHGHQ¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRI&
and 98 submitted on 31 August 2010.  
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freedom to decide themselves on which matters they want to regulate in collective 
agreements and on which legitimate methods [are] to be used in their effort to promote 
and defend the interest of their members. 76 
 
In its 2013 General Report on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, the ILO 
Committee of Experts agreed with this view expressing deep concern at the consequences of 
WKHGHFLVLRQILQGLQJWKDWµimposing sanctions on unions for leading a legitimate strike is a 
grave violation of the principles of freedom of association.¶77  
 
As the foregoing examples show, the interrelationship between EU law and international law 
in the context of collective labour rights has the potential to be contentious and conflictual. 
For EU Member States, this gives rise to uncertainty due to the differing obligations under the 
various regimes.   Of interest in this context is the potential offered by the CFR which was 
bestowed with constitutional status under the Lisbon Treaty. As outlined above, the Charter 
was intended to provide a means of bringing together the ECHR78 and ILO principles with the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States, the jurisprudence of the ECSR and the case 
law of the CJEU and of the ECtHR.  Although the CFR is not intended to be the source of any 
QHZSURYLVLRQVEXWUDWKHUWRSURYLGHDPHDQVRIPDNLQJH[LVWLQJULJKWVµPRUHYLVLEOH¶LWV
status as a catalogue of the full range of rights available to EU citizens imbued with full 
constitutional force has made it the focus of attention for labour lawyers.79 However, whether 
WKH&KDUWHU¶Vconsolidation of the various instruments will lead to a greater reconciliation of 
                                                          
76 &RPPHQWVE\/2DQG7&2WRWKH,/2¶V&RPPLWWHHRI([SHUWV&($&5RQ6ZHGHQ¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRI&
and 98 submitted on 31 August 2010, para 3. 
77 ILO, Report of the committee of Experts on the Application of conventions and Recommendations (Report III 
(Part 1A)) <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_205472.pdf>, 178, accessed 8 June 2015. 
78 Article 52(3) CFR. See also Article 6(2) and (3) TEU. 
79 See some of the contributions in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds) Economic and Social Rights under the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing, 2003) and in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward, The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights +DUW3XEOLVKLQJVHHDOVR6)UHGPDQµ7UDQVIRUPDWLRQRU'LOXWLRQ
)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWLQWKH(86RFLDO6SDFH¶>@ ELJ 1, 41, 55. 
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the varying labour standards which apply across different international regimes remains to be 
VHHQ:HDUHVWLOODWDQHDUO\VWDJHLQWKH(8¶VSRVW-Lisbon constitutional arrangements but it 
is, nevertheless, possible to make some (cautious) predictions regarding the likely effect of 
those arrangements on labour standards within the EU and international legal orders. In the 
QH[WVHFWLRQWKH&)5¶VSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWZLOOEHVSHFLILFDOO\FRQVLGHUHGLQOLJKWRILWVSURPLVH
as a linchpin capable of consolidating and reconciling the various provisions of international 
law with their EU counterparts in the context of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. 
   
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights: Consolidation or Reconciliation? 
 
Although the full range of international instruments outlined above is of obvious relevance to 
WKHLVVXHVXQGHUUHYLHZLWLV(8ODZ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(&+5WKDWKDVGUDZQWKHPRVW
attention in this respect. This is perhaps unsurprising given the differences in scope and 
HQIRUFHPHQWUHODWLQJWRWKHYDULRXVLQVWUXPHQWV$VRXWOLQHGDERYHWKH,/2¶VVWDQGDUGVDUH
EURDGO\DQDORJRXVZLWKWKH(6&¶VSURYLVLRQVDQGDOWKRXJKERWKKDYHEHHQWKHVXEMHFWRI
broad interpretation, it is the ECHR that has been at the forefront of the expansion of the 
rights to collective bargaining and to take strike action. In relation to enforcement, although 
WKH(8¶VDSSDUHQWQRQ-FRPSOLDQFHZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGVLQWKHOLJKWRIWKH&-(8¶V
judgment in Laval has been the cause of complaints to both the ILO and ECSR, the lack of 
HIIHFWLYHVDQFWLRQVLQUHVSHFWRIERWKEULQJVWRPLQG+HSSOH¶VQRWLRQRIVRFLDOULJKWVDV µpaper 
tigers, fierce in appearance but missing in tooth and claw.¶80  
 
                                                          
80 Bob Hepple (ed), Social and Labour Rights in a Global Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 238. 
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The lack of effective enforcement has loQJEHHQWKHZHDNOLQNLQWKH,/2¶VHIIRUWVWRLPSURYH
ODERXUVWDQGDUGV'HVSLWHLWVFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(+5&WKH(6&¶VHQIRUFHPHQW
regime is very different from its Council of Europe stable-mate: the ECHR allows for 
individual complaints to the ECW+5ZKHUHDVWKH(6&GHSHQGVRQWKH(&65¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
VXSHUYLVLRQ:KLOVWWKH(6&¶VSROLF\-oriented approach facilitates a broader perspective to be 
taken than is possible through incremental case law development, the lack of legal force 
means that compOLDQFHLVUHOLDQWRQLQGLYLGXDOVWDWHV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRUHVSHFWWKH
recommendations of the ECSR. The enforcement route offered by the ECtHR is of undoubted 
appeal to those concerned with the realisation and, where possible, extension of labour rights. 
Furthermore, the operation of the Court and that of its EU counterpart, the CJEU, against the 
EDFNGURSRIWKH(8¶VQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVHWWOHPHQWJLYHVULVHWRVRPHLQWHUHVWLQJLQWHUSOD\
which has the potential to shape the future application and development of the whole range of 
international instruments. In this respect the CFR acts as a linchpin by bringing the various 
provisions of international and EU law together. However, alongside its consolidation of the 
various regimes, is the CFR capable of providing the necessary reconciliation of the divergent 
standards outlined in this chapter?               
 
The relationship between the EU and the ECHR is still to be formalised.  The Lisbon Treaty 
introduced the necessary constitutional amendments and placed an obligation on the EU to 
accede to the Convention.81  However, the accession process is ongoing: the Draft Agreement, 
which will allow the EU to become a contracting party to the ECHR, was concluded on 5 
April 2013 but has been held by the CJEU to be incompatible with EU law on a number of 
grounds82 sending the negotiators back to the drawing board.  Notwithstanding the lack of any 
IRUPDOUHODWLRQVKLSWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶VSURYLVLRQVKDYHORQJEHHQJLYHQH[SUHVVLRQZLWKLQWKH
                                                          
81 Article 6(2) TEU. 
82 Opinion 2/13 of the Court, 18 December 2014, see further below. 
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EU acquis largely by the CJEU through their incorporation into the general principles of EU 
law as outlined above. In addition, the CFR has provided an explicit articulation of the full 
range of rights available to EU citizens including civic, political, social and economic rights. 
Rather than introducing any new rights, the intention underlying the CFR is to make pre-
H[LVWLQJULJKWVµPRUHYLVLEOH¶83  In the current context, the relevant provisions are Articles 12 
&)5µ)UHHGRPRIDVVHPEO\DQGRIDVVRFLDWLRQ¶84 DQG$UWLFOH&)5µ5LJKWRIFROOHFWLYH 
EDUJDLQLQJDQGDFWLRQ¶85   
 
7KH&KDUWHU¶VVWDWXVLVµHTXDOWRWKDWRIWKH7UHDWLHV¶86 and consequently its provisions have 
DVVXPHGDSDUWLFXODUSURPLQHQFH+RZHYHUWKH&)5¶VKLJKOHYHOVWDWXVGRHVQRWJXDUDQWHH
its unfettered application across all areas of EU activity: its own provisions are intended to 
restrict its scope substantially ± for example, under Article 28 the right of collective 
EDUJDLQLQJDQGFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQPXVWEHH[HUFLVHGµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&RPPXQLW\ODZDQG
national laws and practiFHV¶± and attempts have been made by certain Member States to 
QDUURZLWVDSSOLFDWLRQIXUWKHULQUHODWLRQWRVSHFLILHGDFWLYLWLHV)RUH[DPSOHWKH8.¶VXQHDVH
ZLWKWKHSURYLVLRQRI$UWLFOHOHGWRWKHDGGLWLRQRIVSHFLILFDSSHQGHGµ([SODQDWLRQV¶DQGDQ
additional Article (52(5)CFR)87 intended to prevent those provisions of the CFR deemed to be 
µSULQFLSOHV¶UDWKHUWKDQµULJKWV¶IURPKDYLQJGLUHFWHIIHFW 
 
                                                          
83 See the Preamble to the CFR, para 4. 
84 &RQWDLQHGLQ&KDSWHU,,)UHHGRPVZKLFKSURYLGHVµ(YHU\RQHKDVWKHULJKWWRIUHHGRPRISHDFHIXODVVHPEO\
and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies 
the right of everyone to form anGWRMRLQWUDGHXQLRQVIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIKLVRUKHULQWHUHVWV¶ 
85 &RQWDLQHGLQ&KDSWHU,96ROLGDULW\ZKLFKSURYLGHVµ:RUNHUVDQGHPSOR\HUVRUWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHRUJDQLVDWLRQV
have, in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude 
collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to 
GHIHQGWKHLULQWHUHVWVLQFOXGLQJVWULNHDFWLRQ¶ 
86 Article 6(3) TEU. 
87 Which states that those provisions oIWKH&KDUWHUZKLFKFRQWDLQSULQFLSOHVµPD\EHLPSOHPHQWHGE\OHJLVODWLYH
DQGH[HFXWLYHDFWV¶RIWKH8QLRQDQGWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVZKHQLPSOHPHQWLQJ8QLRQODZ6XFKSURYLVLRQVµVKDOO
be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the UXOLQJRQWKHLUOHJDOLW\¶ 
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7KH&KDUWHU¶VVFRSHLVIXUWKHUUHVWULFWHGE\WKHKRUL]RQWDOSURYLVLRQVRI7LWOH9,,$UWLFOHV-
54  that  its interpretation must be consistent with the various sources from which the rights 
were derived, the most prominent being the Treaties and the ECHR. The Charter is addressed 
µWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVERGLHVRIILFHVDQGDJHQFLHVRIWKH8QLRQZLWKGXHregard for the principle 
RIVXEVLGLDULW\DQGWRWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVRQO\ZKHQWKH\DUHLPSOHPHQWLQJ8QLRQODZ¶88 
$UWLFOH&)5VSHFLILHVWKDWLWGRHVQRWHVWDEOLVKµDQ\QHZSRZHURUWDVN¶RUµPRGLI\
SRZHUVDQGWDVNVDVGHILQHGLQWKH7UHDWLHV¶VRWKDWLWFDQQRWH[WHQGWKH(8¶VFRPSHWHQFH
Koen Lenaerts,89 WKH&-(8¶V9LFH3UHVLGHQWKDVHPSKDVLVHGWKHFRQWLQXLQJUHOHYDQFHRIWKH
&RXUW¶VSUHYLRXVFDVHODZZLWKZKLFKWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH&KDUWHU¶VSURYLVLRQVLVERXQG
through Article 51 and associated Explanations.90 $FFRUGLQJWR/HQDHUWVµonly where the 
explanations relating to the Charter provide no (complete) answer to the questions of 
interpretation with which the ECJ is confronted may the latter have recourse to other methods 
RILQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶91 
 
ArWLFOHVHWVGRZQWKH&)5¶VVFRSHDQGUHOHYDQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIULJKWVDQGSULQFLSOHVDQG
in so doing, defines the relationship between the Charter and the Treaties, and between the 
Charter and the ECHR, respectively. Article 52(2) provides that rights recognised by the CFR 
µVKDOOEHH[HUFLVHGXQGHUWKHFRQGLWLRQVDQGZLWKLQWKHOLPLWV¶GHILQHGE\WKH7UHDWLHVVRWKDW
WKH&KDUWHUGRHVQRWDOWHUWKHV\VWHPRIULJKWVFRQIHUUHGE\WKH(8¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZ92 
Article 52(3) provides that any rights which correspond with those guaranteed by the 
                                                          
88 $UWLFOH&)5.RHQ/HQDHUWVµ([SORULQJWKH/LPLWVRIWKH(8&KDUWHURI)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWV¶>@
ECLR 375, 377. 
89 /HQDHUWVVXSUDQ6HHDOVRWKH&-(8¶VMXGJPHQWLQ&DVH&-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson [2013] 2 
C0/5SDUDVDQGLQZKLFKLWSURFODLPVµ7KHDSSOLFDELOLW\RI(XURSHDQ8QLRQODZHQWDLOV
DSSOLFDELOLW\RIWKHIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVJXDUDQWHHGE\WKH&KDUWHU¶ 
90 2-&7KH([SODQDWLRQUHODWLQJWR$UWLFOHSURYLGHVµ$VUHJDUGVWKH0Hmber States, it follows 
unambiguously from the case-law of the [ECJ] that the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the 
FRQWH[WRIWKH8QLRQLVRQO\ELQGLQJRQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVZKHQWKH\DFWLQWKHVFRSHRI>(8@ODZ¶ 
91 /HQDHUWVVXSUDQ7KH([SODQDWLRQVDUHQRWOHJDOO\ELQGLQJEXWPXVWEHµJLYHQGXHUHJDUGE\WKHFRXUW
RIWKH8QLRQDQGRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶$UWLFOH&)5 
92 EU legislative provisions which are deemed to be contrary to the Charter will be struck down ± see  Case C-
92/09 and C-93/09 Volker and Schecke [2010] ECR I-11063; Case C±236/09 Test-Achats [2011] ECR I±000. 
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&RQYHQWLRQVKDOOKDYHWKHVDPHPHDQLQJDQGVFRSH,WLVH[SOLFLWO\SURYLGHGWKDWWKLVµVKDOO
QRWSUHYHQW8QLRQODZSURYLGLQJPRUHH[WHQVLYHSURWHFWLRQ¶7KHWHUPµPHDQLQJDQGVFRSH¶
includes authorised limitations on the rights so that any exceptions or derogations which may 
be legitimately imposed on the rights set out in the CFR may not exceed those permitted by 
the ECHR.  Furthermore, Article 53 provides that nothing in the CFR shall restrict or 
adversely affect human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised by the ECHR.  
 
The overall effect of the horizontal provisions is that the appropriate level of protection under 
the ECHR acts as a minimum standard when interpreting analogous provisions of the CFR. 
HoweverWKHSLFWXUHLVIDUIURPVWDWLFDVWKHµPHDQLQJDQGVFRSH¶RIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶V
guaranteed rights are, of course, determined not only by the text itself but also by the case law 
of the ECtHR93 which has, over the years, redefined and increased the level of protection 
provided by the Convention, notwithstanding its recent disappointing judgment in RMT.94 
Therefore the past and future case law of the ECtHR must be taken into account in 
LQWHUSUHWLQJDQGDSSO\LQJWKH&)5*LYHQWKHGLVWLQFWGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH&-(8¶VDQG
(&W+5¶VFDVHODZLQWKHFRQWH[WRIFROOHFWLYHODERXUULJKWVWKLVPD\ZHOOJLYHULVHWR
problems of consistency.95 If the ECtHR raises the level of protection or the scope of 
application of a fundamental right to a higher level than that applicable under EU law, the 
CJEU will be obliged to reinterpret the CFR so as to provide the same level of protection, thus 
FKDOOHQJLQJ(8ODZ¶VVXSUHPDF\96  This process, coupled with the fact that its scope is 
broader than the general principles of EU law, provides the Charter with the potential to add 
value by expanding the reach of EU law and contributing to the discovery of new general 
                                                          
93 For example Airey v Ireland, Ser A, No 32, 2 EHRR 305 and Soering v United Kingdom, Ser A, No 161, 11 
EHRR 439. 
94 Discussed supra n. 17. 
95 See Busby and Zahn, supra n. 65. 
96 Lanaerts, supra n. 89, 394. 
23 
 
principles.97  ,QDGGLWLRQE\HQKDQFLQJWKH&-(8¶VDELOLW\WRGUDZRQDUDQJHRISURYLVLRQVLQ
the social field, the CFR provides new possibilities for the interpretation of existing labour 
rights.98  
 
Rather than being threatened by any conflict between the CFR and ECHR, the potentially 
broad interpretation of Article 28 CFR is more likely to be limited by the lack of uncertainty 
DVWRZKHWKHUWKHSURYLVLRQVFRQWDLQHGZLWKLQ&KDSWHU,96ROLGDULW\DUHµULJKWV¶RU
µSULQFLSOHV¶99 However, increased formalisation of the relationship between EU and 
international law has profound consequences for labour standards in this respect. The 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµULJKWV¶PRUHFRPPRQO\SURYLGHGXQGHUVXSUDQDWLRQDODQGGRPHVWLF
legal systems, DQGWKHµSULQFLSOHV¶XQGHUSLQQLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGVLVGLVVROYLQJ7KH
SURPLQHQFHJLYHQWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURYLVLRQVZLWKLQWKH(8¶Vacquis E\WKH&)5DQGWKH(8¶V
impending accession to the ECHR means that such distinctions are likely to become 
unsustainable so that principles which are enshrined within the international order will have to 
be given real credence in future judgments of the CJEU, one example being the wide 
interpretation given by the ECtHR to freedom of association under Article 11 ECHR.  This  
SRVHVDVXEVWDQWLDOFKDOOHQJHWR(8ODZ¶VVXSUHPDF\ZKLFKDOWKRXJKWKHFDXVHRIVRPH
consternation within certain Member States in recent years, has nonetheless afforded them 
GLUHFWLQIOXHQFHRYHUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIODERXUVWDQGDUGV7KH(8¶Vnew constitutional 
settlement and the prominent status given to the CFR has brought the provisions of 
                                                          
97 Lanaerts, supra n. 89, 386. 
98 Busby and Zahn, supra n. 65.  
99 The CFR does not distinguish between rights and principles. Where rights are clearly articulated, its text 
contains specific restrictions relating to their exercise. The revised Explanations to the Charter (OJ 2007 C 303) 
SURYLGHH[DPSOHVRIµSULQFLSOHV¶IRUH[DPSOH$UWLFOHRQWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRISHUVRQVZLWKGLVDELOLWLHVEXWWKH\
also state that some articles may contDLQHOHPHQWVRIULJKWVDQGSULQFLSOHV6HHIXUWKHU&%DUQDUGµ7KH(8
&KDUWHURI5LJKWV+DSS\WK%LUWKGD\¶>@(86$5HYLHZDYDLODEOH
<https://eustudies.org/assets/files/eusa_review/winter2011.pdf>, 6, accessed 8 June 2015. 
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LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZZLWKLQWKH(8¶VODERXUODZIUDPHZRUNWKHUHE\UHGXFLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
influence.100  
 
 
The New EU Legal Order - Beyond Consolidation and Reconciliation?  
 
8QGHUWKH(8¶VSUH-/LVERQFRQVWLWXWLRQWKH(&+5¶VSURYLVLRQVDOWKRXJKGLUHFWO\DFFHVVLEOH
through individual applications to the ECtHR, were rarely invoked by those seeking to assert 
labour rights. Weak enforcement mechanisms coupled with the perception that lofty human 
rights standards should be reserved for compelling moral claims rather than being invoked by 
WKRVHVHHNLQJHQKDQFHGSURWHFWLRQRIODERXUULJKWVOLPLWHGWKH(&W+5¶VLPSDFWRQODERXUODZ
However, in the post-Lisbon era, the interplay between the EU acquis and international law 
has the potential to extend labour rights with the CFR acting as linchpin.  
 
The CFR was intended to consolidate the provisions of international law which, through their 
LQFRUSRUDWLRQLQWR(8ODZ¶VJHQHUal principles, had application in the interpretation of pre-
H[LVWLQJODERXUULJKWV%\IXOILOOLQJLWVREMHFWLYHRIµPDNLQJULJKWVYLVLEOH¶WKH&KDUWHU¶V
articulation of such rights provides it with the potential to move beyond consolidation towards 
reconciliation. Its use in this context would require a double movement between EU and 
international law which could go beyond reconciliation towards the extension of labour 
VWDQGDUGV,QWKHILUVWPRYHPHQWWKH&)5¶VDSSDUHQWO\QDUURZFRQVWUXFWLRQRIODERXUULghts 
XQGHULWVKRUL]RQWDOSURYLVLRQVDQGWKHµULJKWVSULQFLSOHV¶GLVWLQFWLRQZRXOGEHZLGHQHG
Despite guarantees to the contrary, this process is inevitable if the Charter is to meet its self-
imposed obligation to maintain the minimum standards under the ECHR including its ongoing 
                                                          
100 For an illustration of this point, see Protocol 30 to the Lisbon Treaty on the Application of the Charter of 
)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWVRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQWR3RODQGDQGWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPGLVFXVVHGLQ&%DUQDUGµ7KH
µ2SW-2XW¶IRUWKH8.DQG3RODQGIURPWKH&KDUWHURI)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWV7ULXPSKRI5KHWRULFRYHU5HDOLW\"¶
[2008] 11 Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Europaforschung, 257. 
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LQWHUSUHWDWLRQE\WKH(&W+57KLVFRXOGVLJQLILFDQWO\HQKDQFHWKH&)5¶VSRWHQWLDOJLYLQJULVH
to the second movement by which any expansion of the relevant general principles initiated 
E\WKH(&W+5¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHZLOOILQGLWV ZD\LQWR(8ODZWKURXJKWKH&-(8¶VRQJRLQJ
interpretation of the CFR.   
 
If realised, this process could give the CFR far greater potential as an agent of change than 
originally envisaged or indeed intended. If effected, this double movement could provide the 
opportunity for the extension of labour rights within the EU acquis. An obvious candidate for 
expansion through this process is collective action which, as this chapter has shown, is the 
subject of a range of competing standards within EU and international law.  With the 
convergence of both systems, this lack of clarity is surely unsustainable both from the 
perspective of legal certainty and for those Member States who must reconcile competing 
obligations under EU and international law. It is therefore perhaps only a matter of time 
EHIRUHWKH(&W+5¶VPRUHSURJUHVVLYHLQWHUSUetation of Article 11 ECHR reappears with a 
view to prevailing7KLVZRXOGSURYLGHWKHXOWLPDWHWHVWRIWKH(8LQVWLWXWLRQV¶DQGRU
0HPEHU6WDWHV¶DELOLW\WRSUHYHQWLWVZLGHVSUHDGDGRSWLRQ,QILQGLQJWKH'UDIW$JUHHPHQWRQ
WKH(8¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH(&+5incompatible with EU law, the CJEU, objected inter alia to 
WKH$JUHHPHQW¶VGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHVSHFLILFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI(8/DZ,QSDUWLFXODULW
observed that  Article 53 ECHR reserves to the Contracting Parties the power to lay down 
higher standards, whether in their national laws or in international agreements. In its prior 
interpretation of the ostensibly similar Article 53 CFR, the Court precluded Member State 
from having standards that undermine the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU Law.101 In 
requiring Article 53 ECHR to be coordinated with Article 53 CFR, including its own 
interpretation,102 WKH&RXUWKDVUHFRJQLVHGWKHWKUHDWWR(8ODZ¶VVXSUHPDF\SRVHGE\
                                                          
101 Judgment in Case C-399/11 Melloni (Apr. 5, 2013), <http://curia.europa.eu/>, accessed 8 June 2015 . 
102 See Opinion 2/13 at paras 187±190. 
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DFFHVVLRQWRWKH(&+57KH(8¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH(&+5KDVEHHQWHPSRUDULO\VWDOOHGE\WKH
CRXUW¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQ+RZHYHUZLWKWKHFRQVSLULQJIRUFHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDQG
LQFUHDVLQJO\JOREDOLVHGODERXUPDUNHWV(8ODZ¶VDELOLW\WRSURWHFWLWVRZQVXSUHPDF\LQWKH
longer term remains to be seen. 
 
